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 Income and longevity revisited: do
high-earning women live longer?
Friedrich Breyer1, Jan Marcus2
The empirical relationship between income and longevity has been addressed
by a large number of studies, but most were conﬁned to men. In particular,
administrative data from public pension systems are less reliable for women
because of the loose relationship between own earnings and household in-
come. Following the procedure ﬁrst used by Hupfeld (2010), we analyze
a large data set from the German public pension scheme on women who
died between 1994 and 2005, employing both non-parametric and paramet-
ric methods. To overcome the problem mentioned above we concentrate on
women with relatively long earnings history. We ﬁnd that the relationship
between earnings and life expectancy is very similar for women as for men:
Among women who contributed at least for 25 years, a woman at the 90th
percentile of the income distribution can expect to live 3 years longer than
a woman at the 10th percentile.
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i1. Introduction
The relationship between income and longevity not only points to prevailing inequality of
life chances within developed societies and the consequences of poverty but also greatly
inﬂuences distributive eﬀects of public pension systems (Breyer & Hupfeld 2009).
To date, a positive relationship has been shown to prevail empirically for a number
of countries (Mackenbach et al. 2003). Due to a lack of high-quality data, Germany is
usually missing in these international studies (see, e.g. König (2000: 269), Reil-Held
(2000: 6), Lampert et al. (2007: 12), Schneider (2007: 39) and von Gaudecker & Scholz
(2007: 84)). For Germany, e.g., since the establishment of the Research Data Centre of
the German Pension Insurance Administration in 2004, a new data set has been made
available for scientiﬁc analyses (Himmelreicher et al. 2006). So far, it was solely employed
to investigate the relationship between income and longevity for men (von Gaudecker &
Scholz 2007; Shkolnikov et al. 2007; Breyer & Hupfeld 2009; Himmelreicher et al. 2008;
Hupfeld 2010). But it is of obvious scientiﬁc interest to know whether this holds for
women as well. It was argued, however, that due to the predominant role model of the
male breadwinner, the income measured by the public pension system is a valid indicator
of lifetime earnings for men but not for women.
To mitigate this problem we apply a diﬀerent income measure in this paper. It fo-
cuses on average yearly income instead of lifetime income. We develop further remedy
measures like multiple imputation and sample restrictions, to cope with other problems
of the data set (like missing values and selectivity). We are the ﬁrst to study the re-
lationship between income and longevity for women with a data set from the German
public pension system.
The outline is as follows. First we present a review of theoretical hypotheses on the
relationship between income and longevity (Section 2) as well as an overview of empirical
studies for Germany in this ﬁeld (Section 3). For a better understanding of the data
set Section 4 brieﬂy introduces relevant features of the German public pension system.
Section 5 discusses advantages and drawbacks of the public pension system data set,
before it describes the relevant variables. In Section 6 we describe measures to cope
with some of the problems of the data set as well as the estimation techniques. Section
7 presents the empirical ﬁndings, while Section 8 concludes.
12. The Causal Link
There are three diﬀerent channels through which income and longevity might be related.
First, it is possible that income has a causal eﬀect on longevity. Second, the direction of
the causal eﬀect might be the reverse, i.e. from longevity (or to be more precise: health)
to income. Third, there might be only a spurious relationship between the two variables,
which means that there are underlying factors inﬂuencing both longevity and income.
In general, all three channels tend to argue for a positive relationship.3
Epidemiologists adhere to the ﬁrst causal direction, while some economists stress
the second causal relation (see von Gaudecker & Scholz 2007: 84). Those who stress
the ﬁrst causal direction argue that richer people can get more and better medical
care. Furthermore, poorer people might live in environments that are not conducive
to longevity, like poor housing conditions, polluted and crime-prone neighborhoods etc.
(Goldman 2001: 126). An additional eﬀect might derive from a negative psychosocial
impact of being at the low end of the income distribution on the health status (Reil-Held
2000: 5).
An argument for the reverse eﬀect is that individuals in a poor health condition work
less due to sick leaves and consequently get less income (Adams et al. 2003: 5; Smith
1998: 195). Additionally, they might have fewer chances to be promoted, might be more
likely to get ﬁred and less likely to get re-employed (Grünheid 2005: 157).
Finally, those favoring the third relationship often argue that education inﬂuences
both health and income as an underlying factor. Better educated persons work more
often in jobs that are less harmful to health and have better access to information on
health care, health risks (Goldman 2001: 126) and illness prevention (Reil-Held 2000: 4).
As other potential common factors inﬂuencing both longevity and income von Gaudecker
& Scholz (2007: 84) mention ability, genes, intelligence, networks and social skills. Case
et al. (2002) show that parental income might be another potential underlying factor.
There are also formal models establishing a relationship between income and
health/longevity. The most prominent one is the model by Grossman (1972) which
in its pure investment version establishes a positive link between income (i.e. the wage
rate) and health and in its pure consumption model a negative one. In their optimal-
length-of-life model Ehrlich & Chuma (1990) establish again a positive link between
income and longevity.
3This paper is not aimed at disentangling the true causal relationship between income and
health/longevity. It is only important that there is a theoretical link between the two variables
but not how they are linked.
23. Previous Empirical Findings for Germany
In most countries analyses on the link between life-expectancy and income are based on
a combination of information from a national census and population registers (Kroll &
Lampert 2009: 5). This is not feasible in Germany due to the absence of both, a central
population register and a recent full census with the relevant information. To mitigate
this problem both survey and process produced data were used so far to analyze the
relationship between income and longevity in Germany.4
Schneider (2007) ﬁnds a positive relationship between income and age at death ana-
lyzing the MONICA study, a WHO initiated medical survey. Using data from the Life
Expectancy Survey, Grünheid (2005) shows the mortality rate to be higher for low in-
come groups. In general, health status and satisfaction with health condition would be
lower for groups on the left of the income distribution.
With data obtained from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP), Reil-Held
(2000), Lampert et al. (2007) and Kroll & Lampert (2009) ﬁnd that individuals with
high income live much longer than those with low income. Kroll & Lampert (2009: 23)
calculate a diﬀerence of fourteen years for men and eight years for women between those
that have less than 60% of the median net equivalent income (“poverty-risk-group”) and
those with more than 150% of the median net equivalent income. The diﬀerence in
healthy life expectancy, conditional on reaching the age 65, between these two groups is
speciﬁed in Lampert et al. (2007: 16) to be 5.9 years for men and 3.9 years for women.
Reil-Held (2000: 23-24) also ﬁnds a diﬀerence of six years between individuals in the
lowest and highest income quartile for men and four years for women.5
Using data from a large social health insurer, AOK, for the administrative district
Mettmann, Geyer & Peter (2000) ﬁnd income to have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
longevity, even stronger than the eﬀects of education and occupational status when
controlling for them.
For data of the German public pension system, Himmelreicher et al. (2008: 277-278)
observe a diﬀerence for men of 2.9 years of life-expectancy, conditional on reaching
65, between the second and the ﬁfth income quintile. They also ﬁnd civil servants
to live two years longer on average than those insured in the German public pension
system. Using the same data source but diﬀerent speciﬁcations, Shkolnikov et al. (2007:
4For a comprehensive overview of international ﬁndings see Goldman (2001).
5These quantiﬁcations of the mortality diﬀerence are, however, only estimated for an exemplary in-
dividual that is married, has ﬁnished vocational training and has mean satisfaction with its health
status.
3266) detect a diﬀerence of 2.3 years of life-expectancy at age 65 between the top and
the bottom quintile. Also using data from the German public pension system, von
Gaudecker & Scholz (2007: 101) obtain a lower bound for the diﬀerence in longevity
of men, conditional on reaching 65, between the highest and the lowest quartile of six
years. With data from the same source, Breyer & Hupfeld (2009: 365) ﬁnd an increase
of four years for each additional point of average annual earning points for men.6
All researchers using data from the German public pension system (von Gaudecker
& Scholz 2007; Shkolnikov et al. 2007; Breyer & Hupfeld 2009; Himmelreicher et al.
2008; Hupfeld 2010) ﬁnd the relationship between income and longevity to be non-
monotonous. While this non-monotonicity is basically ignored in Breyer & Hupfeld
(2009), this is argued to be an artifact of the data in von Gaudecker & Scholz (2007),
Shkolnikov et al. (2007) and Himmelreicher et al. (2008). Only Hupfeld (2010) comes
up with a theoretical rationale for the non-monotonous relationship. He argues that
especially at the left of the income distribution higher incomes might result from either
higher wages (originating from a higher individual productivity) or simply more labor
supply. If one assumes that increased working hours reduce life-expectancy, a theoretical
explanation for the non-monotonicity is found.
Those arguing in favor of an artifact of the data claim that the income of the poorest
is underestimated by the public pension data since they have additional income outside
the public pension system (see e.g. Himmelreicher et al. 2008: 278), e.g. from salaries
as civil servants or income from self-employment,7 which are not covered by the public
pension system (see Section 4). Interestingly, among the lowest income quintile the share
of those with voluntary social health insurance turns out to be the highest (Shkolnikov
et al. 2007: 267). This is taken as an indicator for additional income outside the pension
system, which makes those on the very left of the income distribution in fact richer than
those a little further to the right of this distribution. This might explain why those on
the very left of the income distribution live longer than those with only a little more
income.
Nevertheless, this non-monotonicity is not necessarily an artifact of the pension data:
Reverting to data from the GSOEP also Reil-Held (2000: 21, 22) observes a non-
monotonous relationship in her Cox-Proportional-Hazard models, though without fur-
6These points are used to calculate the pension claims of a given individual (see Sections 4 and 5.2)
and also serve as income indicator.
7See Section 5 for a more detailed discussion of this problem.
4ther commenting this.8 In Geyer & Peter (2000: 303) the lowest quintile of the income
distribution is revealed to have a lower mortality risk than the second quintile. In Schnei-
der (2007: 47) income enters only linearly into the regression equation, so a nonlinear
relationship cannot be detected without residual diagnostics.
Since there are strong arguments both in favor of a true non-linear relationship and
in favor of a data artifact that lead to this non-linear relationship, the present study
also performs nonparametric analyses. These put fewer restrictions on the shape of the
relationship between longevity and income.
4. The German Public Pension System
The German public pension system9 is a pay-as-you-go statutory insurance for all
workers, salaried employees, craftsmen, self-employed artists and journalists. The self-
employed and the non-working can voluntarily choose to join the public pension system.
Civil servants have their own pay-as-you-go system. The public pension system covers
roughly 85 % of the workforce in Germany. The contributions amount to 19.9% for every
Euro earned below a contribution ceiling (“Beitragsbemessungsgrenze”) of 5500 Euro of
gross monthly earnings 10 in West Germany and 4650 Euro in East Germany.11 Persons
earning less than 400 Euros per month are exempt.
To receive full pension beneﬁt payments one has to reach a certain age. This is
currently 65 years but will be gradually shifted to 67 years between 2012 and 2029.
Earlier retirement leads to discounts of 3.6 per cent per year (see below). Exceptions are
only possible for miners with at least 25 years of contributions, for unemployed persons
with at least 15 years of contributions and for individuals with a disability (which has
to be certiﬁed by a physician). All these groups might retire at the age of 60 without
losses in their pension payments.12
Currently, the monthly beneﬁt payments of a pension (P) for the i-th individual at
8In her calculations for an exemplary person Reil-Held (2000: 24) ﬁnds a person to live on average
one year longer if the person belongs to the second income quartile instead of the third. This holds
for both men and women.
9For more elaborated descriptions of the system the reader is referred to Breyer & Buchholz (2009:
115-118) and Börsch-Supan & Wilke (2004: 10-19), where all information in this section is obtained
from if nothing else is stated.
10This is approximately twice the average monthly gross wage (Börsch-Supan & Wilke 2004: 11).
11Figures refer to 2010.
12These regulations were subject to change over time (see Börsch-Supan & Wilke 2004: 17).
5point t are computed according to the following formula (the so-called “Rentenformel”):
Pit = EPi  AFRi  AFPi  CPVt (1)
The elements of this product are deﬁned below:












where yi is the annual contribution of the i-th person. Hence, EP is the ratio of
individual earnings and average earnings added over all periods.13
Adjustment Factor for Retirement Age (AFR): This is the so-called “Zugangsfak-
tor” which takes on the value 1 if the retirement age is 65. It is discounted by
0.3 % per month of early retirement and increased by 0.5 % per month of retire-
ment after 65.
Adjustment Factor for Type of Pension (AFP): It takes on the value 1 for old-age
pension, 0.55 for widow’s pension and 0.5 for pensions due to a reduction in the
earning capacity (henceforth: disability pension).
Current Pension Value (CPV): It corrects for the ratio of current workers and the
stock of pensioners. It is indexed to annual changes in the wage level, to changes
in the contribution rate and to changes in a private retirement provision factor. In
2004 the CPV was 26.13e in West Germany and 22.97e in East Germany (Breyer
& Hupfeld 2009: 366).
There are few explicit redistributive measures in the German public pension system.
It is based on the concept of tax-beneﬁt proportionality (“Teilhabeäquivalenz”), which
states that “within any cohort [...] monthly beneﬁt claims are proportional to lifetime
earnings” (Breyer & Hupfeld 2009: 360).
5. Data
We use the scientiﬁc user-ﬁle “Demographie Rentenwegfall 1993-2005” (see FDZ-RV
(2007) for a more detailed description), made available by the Research Data Cen-
13Only for the earnings that are liable to contribution (see above).
6ter of the German Pension Insurance Union (“Forschungsdatenzentrum der Rentenver-
sicherung”, FDZ-RV). It contains a 10 % sample of all pensions that were discontinued
between December 1993 and November 2005 due to death. This amounts to more than
828,000 observations.
5.1. Pros and Cons
As long as there are no better data sources available, the best way to examine the rela-
tionship between longevity and income is triangulation, i.e. to use diﬀerent methods and
data sets to validate the results (Schnell et al. 2005: 262). The administrative pension
data overcome some of the problems speciﬁc to survey data, especially non-response,
recollection errors, panel attrition, small sample sizes and measurement problems of the
main variables (Himmelreicher et al. 2008: 275). In addition, the large sample size allows
drawing conclusions also for small subgroups of the population. Nevertheless, also some
speciﬁc problems exist and as King et al. (1994: 206) put it: “real problems often come in
clusters, rather than alone”. They have to be kept in mind when analyzing the data, and
remedy measures for some of them have to be developed (see Section 6). The problems
can be broadly classiﬁed into shortcomings regarding the income measure (problems 1
to 4), deﬁcits regarding the longevity-measure (problems 5 and 6) and general problems
(7 to 9).
1. The data do not allow merging diﬀerent individuals from the same household (von
Gaudecker & Scholz 2007: 88). Income according to the pension data may not
represent the actual income of an individual. It neglects the contributions of other
household members to the available household income or the consumption of it
(Breyer & Hupfeld 2009: 367). This problem is especially worrisome when analyz-
ing women, since within the analyzed birth cohorts the model of the male bread
winner is predominant. This is the reason why most researchers using the Ger-
man public pension data exclude women (see von Gaudecker & Scholz (2007: 88),
Shkolnikov et al. (2007: 265) Himmelreicher et al. (2008: 275-276), Hupfeld (2010);
also Kroll & Lampert (2009: 7) recommend leaving out women).14 On the other
hand, if longevity is not causally inﬂuenced by aﬄuence (which can be measured by
household income) but by education of the individual, the person’s own earnings is
the adequate income measure.
14Himmelreicher et al. (2008: 276) mention an additional problem of including women: parenting times,
which increase the pension beneﬁt claims, violate the assumption that the sum of pension beneﬁt
claims is a valid indicator of lifetime earnings.
72. Lifetime earnings are underestimated since the pension data do not capture some
types of labor income (see Section 4), like income from self-employment and the
salaries of civil servants. The underestimation might be less severe in East Ger-
many since the coverage rates there are higher (Himmelreicher et al. 2006: 275).15
Furthermore, labor income which is generated in foreign countries is not considered.
This is especially relevant for migrants.
3. Other income sources are completely ignored, like capital income, transfers and
bequests for all individuals (von Gaudecker & Scholz 2007: 87). This reinforces the
underestimation of income.
4. The average annual income in the pension data is right- and left-censored (Him-
melreicher et al. 2006: 4): It is right-censored due to a contribution ceiling (see
Section 4) and left-censored due to some small redistributive measures, like a pen-
sion increase on account of the Pension According to Minimum Income (“Rente
nach Mindesteinkommen”), which could be obtained until 1992.
5. The longevity measure overestimates the population longevity since the public pen-
sion data set does not cover deaths before the ﬁrst pension payment. Kroll &
Lampert (2009: 7) suspect that this might bias the results of an analysis of the
relationship between income and longevity since early deaths might be more pro-
nounced among the poor.
6. Data made available by the FDZ-RV cover only deaths in the period 1994-2005.
Therefore, they are based on death cohorts rather than birth cohorts.
7. The data is based upon pensions and not upon individuals. These two concepts
coincide in many cases as one person usually obtains only a single pension. However,
in some situations a person receives more than one pension (e.g. additional widow’s
pensions). Following the recommendations in FDZ-RV (2007: 3) we include a
constraint on the type of pension: to avoid the inclusion of double payments, we
consider only pensions due to old age and due to disability (Hupfeld 2010: see also).
The restriction reduces the cases from 828,257 to 794,178 (4 % reduction). After
imposing the restriction, we will refer to the observations as individuals.
8. Due to reasons of data privacy some of the variables are rounded to integers and/or
capped at certain limits (Himmelreicher et al. 2006: 10).
15In the former German Democratic Republic almost all individuals were insured under the public
pension system of the state (von Gaudecker & Scholz 2007: 85).
89. Some variables contain many missing values. List-wise deletion of cases with mis-
sing values might bias the results. Due to the high share of missing values and
the diﬃculties to infer from the other variables on values of the concerned variable,
some variables cannot be used for the analyses. This applies especially to marital
status and number of children, which - if available - might be used to create a
subsample of single women to circumvent the ﬁrst problem mentioned.16
5.2. Description of the Variables
After restricting the sample to only pensions due to old age or disability, 794,178 obser-
vations remain, which include 392,595 females. In the following we describe the relevant
variables as well as their incidence of missing values. Actually, the data set “Demographie
Rentenwegfall 1993-2005” contains additional variables which are either not included due
to their irrelevance for the analyses or due to strong concerns about their validity (see
above).
Age at death: obtained from the diﬀerence between date, i.e. year and month, of death
and date of birth 17 (76 missing values).
Sex: pensioner’s sex (no missing values).
Type of pension: indicates whether a person received an old-age pension or a disability
pension. Since the latter is transformed into an old-age pension at the latest with
reaching age 65 Hupfeld (2010), individuals whose last pension was a disability
pension died rather young (no missing values).
First pension beneﬁt payment: the year in which a pension was paid for the ﬁrst time
(14,618 missing values).
First pension beneﬁt payment of the current pension: the year in which the cur-
rent pension was paid for the ﬁrst time (17,215 missing values).
Total Beneﬁt claims (TBC): is basically the product of EPi and AFRi and AFPi
from formula (1). This measure also includes earning points from non-contributory
periods (FDZ-RV 2007: 13) like spells of long-term sickness and/or unemployment
16Additional problems with these variables arise because they are imprecisely measured: the data
records the number of children only for one parent since only one parent can use parenting times
for the calculation of the pension Hupfeld (2010); for marital status the unmarried and the widowed
appear in one category.
17The month of death is deﬁned as the month with the last pension payment (FDZ-RV 2007: 1). There
are 76 individuals with missing month of birth.
9(von Gaudecker & Scholz 2007: 86). Beneﬁt claims do not exceed 70 points to
guarantee anonymity (see problem 8) (no missing values).
Years of contribution (YOC): the number of years an individual contributed to the
pension system, including substitute and inactive periods (“Ersatz- und Ausfalls-
zeiten”) like times of education, parenting, military service, pregnancy and inca-
pacitation for work (Breyer & Buchholz 2009: 116). They are rounded to integers
and capped at 45 (582,984 missing values).
Average Annual Earning Points (AEP): the ratio of TBC and YOC (582,984 missing
values).
Spells of ill-health: the number of months spent in sickness or rehabilitation. This
variable includes only times relevant for the calculation of pension beneﬁts. They
are capped at 48 (582,984 missing values).
Spells of unemployment: the number of months spent in unemployment, as long as
they are relevant for the calculation of pension beneﬁts. Capped at 120 months
(582,984 missing values).
Type of health insurance: indicates whether a person hold an insurance within the
German social health insurance system, had a private health insurance or was
covered by health insurances in other countries18 (no missing values).
Manual calculation: a dummy variable indicating whether the pension was calculated
manually (no missing values).
Federal state: one value for each federal state and one for foreign residence (1637 miss-
ing values).
Observations with missing values regarding the variables federal state, year of ﬁrst pen-
sion beneﬁt payment and ﬁrst year of current beneﬁt payment are completely removed
from the analyses. Their incidence sums up to less than 3:5% of the total sample (26,548
cases altogether). The eﬃciency losses are limited. In Section 6 we describe how we im-
puted missing values for years of contribution, month of birth, months in ill-health and
months in unemployment.
While the sum of beneﬁt claims (TBC) is often regarded as an indicator for lifetime
earnings, the average annual earning points (AEP) refer more to “productivity”. This
18Due to administrative problems some of those individuals indicated to hold a foreign health insurance
are actually privately health insured (FDZ-RV 2007: 10).
10study uses AEP rather than TBC as income indicator.19
It seems more questionable that TBC measures lifetime income for women because in
the analyzed birth cohorts mostly the males are the bread winners in a family. That is
why for women many more periods without labor income exist. The non-contributory
periods aﬀect AEP less and hence its bias is smaller.
In addition, using AEP reduces the eﬀect of underestimating lifetime earnings due to
periods of work in foreign countries and from periods in civil service and self-employment.
If the wage is the same in these non-contribution periods, AEP is still a good indicator
of the average annual income, whereas TBC is a biased indicator for lifetime income.
However, for the cases in which wages diﬀer in the non-contribution periods, Section A.2
discusses some remedy measures.
Furthermore, it seems to be more in line with theory: With TBC as an indicator of
lifetime earnings, the blue-collar worker with lower annual earnings but more contri-
bution years and the white-collar worker with higher annual earnings but fewer years
of contribution (due to an education-related late entrance into the labor market and
earlier retirement) might appear to have the same amount of lifetime earnings. Yet, it
seems more reasonable that the white-collar worker lives longer because she has a better
education and probably a job which less derogates health (see Section 2).
To further reduce the eﬀect of income from periods of work abroad, we follow Shkol-
nikov et al. (2007: 265) in only including German citizens living in Germany.
6. Methods
6.1. Preparing the Data
We had to amend a number of shortcomings of the data before performing the data
analysis. The following paragraph describes these measures taken to enhance the data
set only brieﬂy, while the Appendix includes a detailed description. The remedies fall
into three categories:
Imputation of Missing Values: The relevant variables YOC, months in ill-health and
months in unemployment are highly aﬀected by missing values. Following the
classiﬁcation of Rubin (1976) these values seem to be missing at random (MAR)
19Shkolnikov et al. (2007), von Gaudecker & Scholz (2007), Himmelreicher et al. (2008) and Hupfeld
(2010) use TBC as income indicator while Breyer & Hupfeld (2009) work with AEP. They all
basically analyze men.
11because the missing depends on other variables (e.g. year of retirement) but not
on the (unobservable) number of years of contribution. If only cases with valid
information on YOC are used in the analyses, under MAR the estimators are not
only ineﬃcient but also biased (Cameron & Trivedi 2006: 927). Therefore, this
study applies multiple stochastic regression imputation (Little & Rubin 2002: 60)
to replace each missing value with a set of estimated values.
Restricting the Sample: In the analyzed cohorts the model of the male bread winner
is predominant. Many women left the labor market after only a few years to raise
children, to keep the household or for other reasons.20 Since in general wages
increase with work experience, the average annual income of individuals with fewer
years of contribution is likely to be underestimated in comparison to the average
annual income which is averaged over a longer working life. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to consider only the subset of individuals that contributed to the pension
system at least for a certain number of years.
6.2. Estimation Techniques
There exist empirical evidence as well as theoretical consideration that the relationship
between income and longevity is nonlinear in Germany (see the discussion in Section
3). The exact functional relationship, however, is unknown. For this reason it is advan-
tageous to apply nonparametric estimation techniques, which do not impose functional
form assumptions. Instead they let the data itself “ﬁnd” the functional relation, f(x):
yi = f(xi) + i; (3)
x is the right-hand side variable (here: AEP) and y the left-hand side variable, namely
age at death.
Following Hupfeld (2010) we perform local linear regression. This regression procedure
cuts the data set into small slices and computes regressions for diﬀerent values of x in
which the neighboring values enter with a weight according to their distance. The
further a value is away from the respective x, say x0, the lower the assigned weights in
the regression. The weighting function depends on the choice of the kernel as well as
on the choice of the bandwidth, which determines the meaning of “neighboring”. The
selection of the kernel is less important than the choice of the bandwidth (Kennedy
2025% of the women in the data set have 10 or fewer years of contribution, while this holds only for 6
% of the men.
122008: 356; Cameron & Trivedi 2006: 303). The Epanechnikov kernel is seen as slightly
superior in terms of eﬃciency (Cameron & Trivedi 2006: 303) and therefore chosen in
this paper.
If the bandwidth is chosen too large, more distant observations also enter the local
regression with higher weights. This over-smoothing might smooth out a relevant hump
existing in the population. A bandwidth which is too small appears very rough when
graphed and is more sensible to outliers. Therefore, there is a trade-oﬀ between bias and
variance (Yatchew 2003: 25-26; Kennedy 2008: 356): A lower bandwidth increases the
variance (since high weights are assigned to fewer observations) but at the same time
decreases the bias (because observations far away from x0 have smaller weights assigned
and consequently do not distort the local regression). To evaluate the robustness of
the results carefully, we follow the recommendations in Nichols (2007) to perform the
analyses with diﬀerent bandwidth choices. We use the default bandwidth estimated by
Stata 10’s "lpoly" command, its 50
After selecting kernel and bandwidth, local linear regressions of age at death, y, on
AEP, x, are performed to obtain estimates for E[yjx] at each point of x. To save
computation time, these regressions are only calculated on 50 points of x, which are
equally distributed over the range from 0 to 2.8 AEP.21 Due to the increase in life
expectancy over the diﬀerent death cohorts, we apply the ﬁxed eﬀects transformation,
i.e. we subtract the respective death cohort means of AEP and age of death from the
individual values. This is a way of including ﬁxed death year eﬀects in a nonparametric
setting. For illustrative purposes we add later on the overall means, which is a linear
transformation and does not change the shape of the curves.
In the computations we only use one of the imputed versions of YOC because it is very
diﬃcult to combine the results of the diﬀerent imputation versions meaningfully. We
use ordinary least squares regressions to evaluate the inﬂuence of multiple imputation.
The graphs do not display any conﬁdence bands because due to the huge sample size the
bands are mostly so narrow that it is hard to distinguish them from the actual curve.
A major drawback of local linear regression procedures is that they do not allow
including many covariates. This inclusion would increase the necessary number of ob-
21There are also some far outliers in the AEP distribution, which are probably measurement errors and
also less relevant for the analysis because the bulk of observations is below 2.8 AEP. We chose this
speciﬁc value, 2.8 because it is the highest value of AEP under restriction - 2.8 is the maximum of
beneﬁt claims (70) divided by the minimum years of contribution (25). It is important to keep in
mind that the computation of E[yjx] is performed using all observations of the sample, while the
graph displays the results only for the limited range.
13servations disproportionately to achieve the same precision. This is the so-called curse
of dimensionality. The more regressors are included, the fewer observations exist close
to a speciﬁc combination of covariates.22
Least squares regressions do not only allow for the inclusion of diﬀerent control vari-
ables, but also provide quantiﬁcations of the relationship between AEP and age at death.
A further advantage is that more ready-made options for the aggregation of multiple im-
putation results exist: Means and standard errors of the OLS estimators are calculated
according to “Rubin’s rules” (Royston 2004: 228) which are outlined in Little & Rubin
(2002: 86-89). All OLS regressions include ﬁxed death-year dummies to control for the
increase in life expectancy over time. Thus the other variables explain within-death
cohort diﬀerences in age at death.
7. Empirical Findings
7.1. Results of the Nonparametric Estimations
We ﬁrst present the results of the nonparametric local linear regression procedure. Figure
1 displays the relationship between age at death and average annual earning points
(AEP), the income indicator, in the full sample before imputations of missing values
and restrictions were applied.
Figure 1: Nonparametric estimation - Men and Women
Both for men and women age at death decreases in AEP. This is opposite to the
22Observations have to be close to x0, which is now a k-dimensional vector, not only in a single
dimension but in a k-dimensional sphere, with k being the number of regressors.
14theoretical expectations and not in line with previous empirical ﬁndings (see Sections
2 and 3, respectively). However, it is possible that some problems of the data set
mentioned in Section 5.1 caused the surprising slopes.
The shape of the relationship changes dramatically when the imputation measures de-
scribed above are applied to the data set and the sample is restricted to those pensioners
with long contribution periods.23
Figure 2: Nonparametric estimation - restrictions
(a) Women, diﬀerent restrictions (b) Men, diﬀerent restrictions
The two panels of Figure 2 show that when the measures are applied, the curves are
now overall upward sloping. When we restrict the sample to women with at least 25
years of contribution (“R.25”, solid line) the increase in age at death is rather monotonous
in AEP and with the exception of the interval between 1 and 1.5 AEP almost linear.
Lifting the threshold from 25 to 30 years of contribution further increases the slope but
does not alter the overall shape. If all women with at least YOC=20 are considered, the
AEP based diﬀerences in age at death are smaller. According to the graph, the poorest
women live more than 15 years less than the richest. However, one needs to take care
because there are not many individuals in the extreme tails of the AEP distribution.
Nevertheless, also the diﬀerence between a woman with 0.5 average earning points and a
woman with 2 AEP is more than 10 years. Imposing the double restriction (“R.25+SHI”,
dots-and-dashes), i.e. using only the information of women with at least 25 years of
contribution and a social health insurance does not change the overall picture much. The
23Further robustness analyses show that both measures (imputing and restricting the sample) work
against the case of a negative relationship - no matter in which order they are applied. These results
are available from the authors upon request.
15small downward-sloping area on the left can very likely be attributed to few observations
on the left tail of the distribution and some outliers.
The eﬀect of the restrictions is rather similar for men, see panel (b). The maximum
diﬀerence increases with the YOC threshold and the additional social health insurance
restriction has little inﬂuence. In general the slope is steeper and more linear for men
than for women. Only for the restriction “R.20” we observe a small downward-sloping
area on the right tail. This downward-sloping leg disappears when we consider only
men with at least 25 years of contribution. This indicates that basically some men who
contributed between 20 and 25 years with very high annual contributions are responsible
for the observed downward slope.24 To test the robustness of our results, we also use
half of the previous bandwidth and two times the bandwidth. Applying these other
bandwidths has no eﬀect on the observed linear relationship for men. For women using
half the bandwidth from before pronounces the downward-sloping area for the restriction
“R.20’. But when twice the bandwidth is used, this downward-sloping area is basically
smoothed out.
7.2. Results of the Parametric Estimations
An advantage of least squares regressions is that more control variables can be included
than in nonparametric estimations. Table 1 displays the OLS results for three diﬀerent
samples of women: the sample of women before imputation of missing YOC, the re-
stricted sample of women with at least YOC=25 and the subsample of women with at
least YOC=30. In the "untreated" women sample life expectancy decreases in income,
like in the nonparametric case. However this sample is highly selective as it basically
relies on individuals who retired after 1992 and died before 2005. For the other models
the death-year dummy coeﬃcients increase monotonously, as expected. The annual in-
crease in life-expectancy is higher than reported in the oﬃcial statistics (Destatis 2006).
A regression on only the dummy variables reveals that this is not a problem of the data
set. The higher annual increase in life-expectancy results from the applied restrictions
and the included covariates.
24These might be individuals who changed into self-employment after some years of employment that
was subject to contributions.
16Table 1: Results of LS Estimations
unrestricted YOC  25 YOC  30 Men, YOC  25
AEP -6.980 12.273 18.650 8.350
(0.074) (0.88) (0.961) (0.555)
AEP2 0.221 -3.103 -4.674 0.188
(0.004) (0.339) (0.376) (0.217)
ln(Months Ill +1) 1.669 0.25 0.26 1.942
(0.042) (0.115) (0.143) (0.05)
ln(Months Unempl. +1) -.396 -2.761 -2.493 -2.215
(0.029) (0.057) (0.069) (0.047)
West 1.143 1.443 1.709 1.875
(0.103) (0.081) (0.112) (0.053)
YOC -.148 -.463 -.614 -.148
(0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Death in 1995 -1.716 0.442 0.46 0.341
(0.287) (0.193) (0.216) (0.091)
Death in 1996 -.085 1.626 1.667 1.303
(0.269) (0.174) (0.233) (0.088)
Death in 1997 0.623 1.920 1.952 1.532
(0.261) (0.166) (0.215) (0.095)
Death in 1998 0.52 2.174 2.293 1.852
(0.256) (0.158) (0.194) (0.089)
Death in 1999 0.838 2.594 2.711 2.286
(0.253) (0.166) (0.189) (0.088)
Death in 2000 1.261 2.518 2.675 2.176
(0.248) (0.167) (0.207) (0.093)
Death in 2001 1.959 3.087 3.259 2.589
(0.245) (0.152) (0.213) (0.093)
Death in 2002 2.784 3.591 3.797 2.987
(0.241) (0.146) (0.199) (0.087)
Death in 2003 3.429 4.022 4.254 3.384
(0.239) (0.144) (0.181) (0.09)
Death in 2004 4.137 4.378 4.716 3.719
(0.237) (0.146) (0.184) (0.088)
Death in 2005 4.822 4.987 5.300 4.196
(0.235) (0.155) (0.189) (0.087)
Const. 73.547 81.156 81.637 65.401
(0.268) (0.406) (0.528) (0.253)
Obs. 62845 136226 90205 302455
R2 0.195 0.142 0.174 0.186
Diﬀ p90-p10 -5.770 3.190 4.894 6.293
Diﬀ p75-p25 -2.375 1.620 2.420 3.289
The ﬁrst column displays the results for the “untreated” women sample, the next two columns
refer to all women with at least 25 and 30 years of contribution, respectively - after imputation of
missing values. The last column shows the results for men with the same model speciﬁcation as
in the third column. The last two lines display the diﬀerence in expected age at death between
women at the highest and lowest decile of the AEP distribution (“Diﬀ p90-p10”) and women at the
highest and lowest quartile (“Diﬀ p75-p25”), respectively. Parameter estimates and standard errors
are computed according to “Rubin’s rules” (Little & Rubin 2002: 86-89) using the Stata ado-ﬁle
“micombine” (see Royston 2004). Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0:05; ** p < 0:01; ***
p < 0:001.
17In the two restricted women samples the linear term of AEP is positive and the squared
term is negative, meaning that age of death increases in annual earnings at a decreasing
rate. Maximum age at death is reached at 1.98 and at 1.99 annual earnings points,
respectively, for the samples of all women with at least 25 or 30 years of contribution.
We estimate the diﬀerence between the highest and the lowest AEP decile in the re-
spective women sample to be about three years for the ﬁrst restriction and almost ﬁve
years for the second restriction. Diﬀerences between the highest and lowest quartile are
1.6 and 2.4 years, respectively. These diﬀerences are somewhat smaller than those for
men (see the last column in Table 1), which is in line with previous ﬁndings (Reil-Held
2000; Lampert et al. 2007; Kroll & Lampert 2009). However, for both men and women
our estimated diﬀerences are lower than the diﬀerences calculated in Reil-Held (2000)
based on the GSOEP. With data from the German public pension system, Himmelre-
icher et al. (2008) and Shkolnikov et al. (2007) estimate a diﬀerence of about two years
between the highest and lowest quintile, while von Gaudecker & Scholz (2007) estimates
a diﬀerence of more than six years between the two extreme quartiles. Our estimate for
men of about 3.3 years diﬀerence lies between these previous ﬁndings.
The insigniﬁcant squared AEP term in the model for men points to an approximately
linear relationship between AEP and age at death for men. This matches the graph of
the local linear regression.
Holding all other variables constant, there is only a small eﬀect of months in ill-health
on life expectancy for women in the restricted models, as compared with men. It is in
accordance with previous ﬁndings (e.g. Helmert 2000: 178) that the health status of
individuals who experienced unemployment is worse, and the size of this eﬀect is similar
for women and for men. In all our models, West Germans could expect to live longer
than East Germans. This diﬀerence is smaller for women than for men. Hupfeld (2010)
ﬁnds Eastern Germans to live almost one year longer in his least squares estimations.
Yet, his estimates rely only on the (probably highly selective) cases with non-missing
information on YOC. Ceteris paribus, the eﬀect of YOC is negative in all models. A
woman with the same “productivity”, measured by her annual earnings, lived less long
if she worked longer, and the size of this eﬀect is three to four times as large as for men.
188. Conclusion
This paper is the ﬁrst investigation of the relationship between income and longevity
for women on the basis of data from the German public pension system. It had to deal
with several shortcomings of the data set: We countered the high incidence of missing
values in key variables by applying a multiple imputation procedure which improved the
single, regression-based imputation procedures of previous studies. All these problems
exist for the analysis of men, too.
The problem of underestimated income seems more burdensome for women though.
In the cohorts under study, for married women the husband was basically the main
bread winner. Therefore, women are likely to have more additional available income
than men. Problems for the present analysis especially arise if this additional income
is negatively correlated with the income measured by the pension data. By using an
income indicator that focuses on average annual income instead of lifetime earnings we
mitigated the underestimation of income due to noncontributory periods. Furthermore,
by means of sample restrictions, we tried to identify a sample of women who were
employed most of their lives and had no additional labor income from self-employment,
salaries as civil-servants and work abroad. The income variable thus deﬁned can therefore
be interpreted as an indicator of labor productivity and thus the observed relationship
with life expectancy as the eﬀect of human capital (education) on longevity.
A simple graphical analysis of the link between earnings and longevity revealed a neg-
ative relationship. Yet, this ﬁnding did not withstand further inspection. Both measures
employed to deal with the aforementioned problems of the data set, i.e. imputation of
missing values and sample restrictions, revealed that the relationship is rather a positive
one. The negative eﬀect observed before seems to be an artifact of the sampling of
those with observed information on the key variable years of contribution. We found the
positive relationship for diﬀerent restriction schemes, diﬀerent choices of the bandwidth
in the nonparametric local linear regressions as well as for various least squares speci-
ﬁcations. Most model speciﬁcations showed that age at death increases monotonously
in income, though not necessarily linearly. In the ex ante preferred model speciﬁcation
(with imputation, where the sample consists of only those women with at least 25 years
of contribution) the nonparametric local linear regression predicted a linear relation-
ship, whereas the OLS regression revealed a slightly concave relationship. We estimate
a woman at the 90th percentile of the income distribution to live 3 years longer than a
woman at the 10th percentile. In line with previous ﬁndings this increase is only about
half as large as for men.
19A. Appendix
A.1. Imputation of Missing Values
Basically due to a major change in the retirement legislation in 1992 the variables YOC,
months in ill-health and months in unemployment are highly aﬀected by missing values.25
Since then the pension calculation is based on a diﬀerent measure of these three variables
and only the new variables are included in the data set. In order to prevent biased
estimates, we impute the missing values as described in the following.
Imputation of Missing Years of Contribution
In Breyer & Hupfeld (2009) and Hupfeld (2010) a regression-based imputation algorithm
is applied: A complete-case regression is performed to explain YOC with the following
variables: TBC, year of birth, year of ﬁrst pension beneﬁt payment, ﬁrst year of current
pension beneﬁt payment, and binary variables for social health insurance, for old-age
pension, for each federal state, for foreign residence and for manually coded pensions.
This regression equation is then used to predict values for those with missing YOC.
Our analysis does not only build on the regression-based imputation procedure de-
scribed above, but it improves it in seven ways. First, a Tobit regression model is applied.
There is censoring from above (at 45 years of contribution; see Section 5.2) and naturally
from below. With censoring, OLS produces inconsistent, downward-biased estimates.
Second, the model includes the square of TBC to allow for a nonlinear relationship
between TBC and YOC. The nonlinear relationship might arise since those with very
high beneﬁt claims are probably those with a long education period and, hence, fewer
years of contribution. Still, in general - holding all others constant - more years of
contribution are associated with higher beneﬁt claims.26
Third, the regression equation incorporates a dummy variable for women as well as
interaction terms between this dummy and all other variables (except the federal state
dummies) to allow for diﬀerent eﬀects of these variables on YOC for women and men. To
account for possible eﬀects of the oversampling of individuals with disability pensions
in the sample with observed YOC, we include interaction terms between the type of
pension and all other variables (again except the federal state dummies but including
25Among others, early retirement discounts were introduced (see Börsch-Supan & Wilke (2004: 6-8)
for a more detailed overview of the 1992 changes).
26Adding this squared term increases the squared correlation between observed and ﬁtted values from
63.34 % to 66.5 % in the Tobit model.
20the female interaction terms).
Fourth, in the complete cases regression individuals with manually calculated pensions
are not included (and, hence, also the variable "manually coded pensions"). These cases
make up a high share of individuals with extraordinary high average annual earning
points (e.g. more than 91% of those with more than four AEP).27 According to the
codeplan of the dataset, for some manually coded cases core variables like YOC might
be unreliable or coded as 0 (FDZ-RV 2007: 6). Therefore we also impute new YOC
values for individuals with manually calculated pensions.
Fifth, we add a stochastic component to the predicted values. The stochastic compo-
nent is a random draw from the residuals of the complete cases regression.28 We perform
this “stochastic regression imputation” to reﬂect the uncertainty of the regression-based
predicted values and to maintain the sample variance (Little & Rubin 2002: 60). With-
out this added stochastic component, the marginal distribution and measures of covari-
ance of the completed data are distorted (Little & Rubin 2002: 64) since the regression-
based imputation is nothing else but a conditional mean imputation (the mean of YOC
given the other variables).
Sixth, to copy the structure of the original variable we round each predicted value to
an integer.29 As in Breyer & Hupfeld (2009) values predicted to be smaller than one or
larger than 45 after adding the stochastic term are rounded to 1 and 45, respectively.
These values are out of the range of the original variable, which is capped at 45.
Seventh, multiple imputation is performed. Multiple imputation does not assign a
single value to each missing entry, but several values. It is superior to single imputation
(King et al. 2001: 49; Little & Rubin 2002: 85; Cameron & Trivedi 2006: 934; McKnight
et al. 2007: 194, 196). Single imputation procedures ignore the imputation uncertainty.
Thus, the standard errors are underestimated and the test statistics inﬂated (King et al.
2001: 66). This paper assigns ﬁve values to each missing value.30
For the 302371 women without information on YOC the ﬁve versions diﬀer only
slightly with respect to their means and standard deviations: less than 0.02 years for
27As there is an upper contribution ceiling and earnings points are basically the ratio of individual
earnings and average earnings (see Section 4), this concentration of high average points seems to be
very unlikely.
28However, the most extreme 5 % of the residuals are not used to avoid overvaluing the stochastic part.
29This rounding makes especially sense in light of Section A.2 where the suggested restriction limits
the sample to those with at least a certain (integer) number of years of contribution.
30Five is the number of imputations most often used (Schnell et al. 2005: 470). It is assumed to be a
suﬃcient number to model the imputation uncertainty adequately (McKnight et al. 2007: 198).
21the mean of YOC and less than 0.01 points for the mean of AEP. Also the standard
deviations do not diﬀer much between the imputation versions.
Further Imputations
The data set contains further variables with missing values. The observations with miss-
ing information about the month of birth are mean-imputed. The missing mechanism
is assumed to be MCAR and the imputation avoids the exclusion of these cases and as
a result improves eﬃciency.
All individuals with missing information on YOC also have missing values for the
variables months in ill-health and months in unemployment. We impute the latter
variable using a negative binomial (Negbin) distributed hurdle model (see Mullahy 1986).
A hurdle model seems to be most appropriate to model the overrepresentation of zeros
(compared to a Poisson distribution) and to control for the possibility that a diﬀerent
combination of the covariates drives the “decision” to spend one month in unemployment
than the “decision” to spend more months in that state when at least one month is spent.
In a ﬁrst step, we estimate the probability to have at least one period of unemployment
by means of a logit regression. The regressors in the regression for YOC act again as
regression.31 The predicted value of those with missing information is compared to a
random value drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation
0.2. If the predicted probability is larger than the random number, it is assumed that
the individual spent at least one month in unemployment.32
A second step computes a truncated Negbin 1 regression only for those with at least
one month in unemployment with the same covariates as in the logit regression above.
For the individuals predicted to have spent at least one month in unemployment, a value
is predicted for the number of months spent in this state, again with a randomly drawn
residual from the observed cases regression added (stochastic regression). We repeat the
procedure (step one and two) four more times to have again a multiple imputed dataset
with ﬁve versions. The imputation of missing months in ill-health follows analogously.
31These covariates are TBC, squared TBC, year of birth, year of ﬁrst pension beneﬁt payment, ﬁrst
year of current pension beneﬁt payment, and binary variables for social health insurance, for old-age
pension, for each federal state and for foreign residence; and interaction terms of old-age pension
and sex with all these variables and each other except the federal state dummies.
32To model the uncertainty of the estimation, we apply no ﬁxed threshold, e.g. 0.5, but draw random
values from this speciﬁc normal distribution. This normal distribution exhibits valuable character-
istics: Almost all values (99.98 %) are in the unit interval with most values concentrating around
the mean 0.5.
22A.2. Restricting the Sample
Sample restrictions mitigate the underestimation of income. Breyer & Hupfeld (2009)
use 35 years of contribution as cut-oﬀ point, while von Gaudecker & Scholz (2007) and
Hupfeld (2010) perform analyses for those with at least 25 years of contribution. We
basically analyze a restricted data set with 20, 25 or 30 years of contribution as alter-
native cut-oﬀ points. This restriction is a reasonable indicator to discriminate between
women that were employed most of their lives and those that spent most of their lives
as housewives but had earned some beneﬁt claims before. Furthermore, it seems the
best option to distinguish individuals who served most years as civil servants or worked
most years in self-employment or abroad, while not reducing the sample size too much.
Sensitivity analyses are performed and reported below.
Another option to reduce the eﬀect of outside labor income is to exclude individuals
with private health insurance and those covered by foreign health insurance, which might
indicate additional sources of income. There is some suspicion that in the lowest income
groups the proportion of additional labor income is the highest (see Section 3). This
suspicion is empirically supported by the data set: In the lowest quintile of the AEP
distribution for men, 28 % are covered by health insurance in other countries and 12
% are covered by private health insurance.33 Excluding the observations from this ﬁrst
quintile, less than 7 % of the men are covered by each of these two types of health
insurance. These patterns are less distinctive for women but still prevalent.
Table 2 displays some summary statistics for diﬀerent sample speciﬁcations. 34 The
ﬁrst two columns contain means and standard deviations, respectively, for the complete
cases sample, i.e. all women with non-missing YOC, while columns three and four make
use of data of all women after imputation. The last two columns display means and
standard deviations for all women with at least 25 years of contribution, again after the
imputations.
Individuals in the incomplete cases sample are on average born earlier, lived longer
and received more often old-age pensions. These diﬀerences can be attributed to the
selection process of the complete cases sample: Due to the aforementioned change in the
retirement legislation, YOC and the two other variables are not available for those who
retired before 1992. Therefore, the complete cases sample consists of individuals who
retired after 1992 and died before 2005.
33One has to keep in mind that some of those indicated to be covered by foreign health insurance are
actually covered by private health insurance (see Section 5.2).
34We display the results of the ﬁrst imputation version.
23Table 2: Summary Statistics for diﬀerent sample speciﬁcations
Complete Cases All Cases YOC  25
Variable Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)
Age at Death 66.57 (9.72) 80.52 (10.17) 78.00 (10.02)
AEP 0.98 (0.78) 1.05 (0.89) 0.97 (0.24)
YOC 23.70 (11.93) 20.03 (11.32) 32.47 (5.09)
TBC 22.22 (13.30) 18.84 (12.69) 31.48 (9.60)
Residence East 0.19 (0.39) 0.23 (0.42) 0.34 (0.48)
Months Ill 1.79 (4.71) 1.75 (4.19) 2.52 (4.72)
Months Unemployed 4.94 (15.07) 2.01 (9.29) 2.50 (10.10)
Old-Age Pension 0.78 (0.41) 0.95 (0.22) 0.93 (0.25)
Soc. Health Ins. 0.86 (0.35) 0.92 (0.27) 0.96 (0.21)
Year of Birth 1934.98 (9.48) 1919.59 (10.54) 1922.44 (10.28)
N 53129 365216 136226
Means and standard deviations of months in ill-health are very similar between the
two subsamples after imputation, while both statistics are higher for the complete cases
for months in unemployment. The total beneﬁt claims of the complete cases sample are
on average higher than those of the incomplete cases. This seems to be the reason why
the imputed YOC are lower on average.35 The sample size increases strongly due to the
imputation procedure.
In the sample of women with at least 25 YOC, mean age at death is smaller than in
the full women sample. Women who did not work for a long time lived longer. Also AEP
is lower in the restricted samples which might be attributed to the implicit truncation
of AEP. AEP, the ratio of TBC and YOC, cannot exceed certain values in the restricted
sample because not only TBC is capped at 70 points (see Section 5.2) but also the
years of contribution are restricted. This construction removes some of the extremely
high AEP values from the sample (see also Sections 6.2 and 7.2). The higher values of
YOC, TBC, months in ill-health and months in unemployment as well as of the share
of Eastern Germans in the restricted samples are not surprising.
35There is a high correlation of the two variables:  = 0.72 (without imputed cases).
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